Abstract. Biased games were recently introduced by Caragiannis et al. [3] as an extension of strategic-form games that can represent psychological biases of players towards certain pure strategies. They showed that for any number of players, and for a wide range of penalty functions that penalize players for deviating from their biases, a biased game admits a mixed-strategy equilibrium. We initiate the study of algorithms for finding approximate equilibria in two-player biased games. This problem is at least as hard as the analogous problem for bimatrix games, which has received much attention. For a natural subclass of two-player games with L 2 2 penalty functions, we characterize best responses and show how they can be computed by a strongly polynomial combinatorial algorithm. Building on this, we design the first polynomial-time algorithm that achieves a non-trivial approximation guarantee for these games. Furthermore, we study the existence of pure equilibria and we prove that games with bias functions in this class can have at most one pure equilibrium.
Introduction
Biased games. The cornerstone of game theory is the assumption that players are rational decision makers. This means that they play in order to maximize their expected payoff. Under this assumption, Nash [19] proved that an equilibrium always exists. Since then, the notion of Nash equilibrium (NE) is the most fundamental concept in the field of game theory and often it is used as a solution for normal form games.
In real life though, the players usually have a priori behavioral biases towards specific strategies before they even learn the payoffs from the game they participate in [21] . As a result, the players often choose strategies that do not maximize the expected payoff they get from the normal form game. Thus, the rationality assumption is violated in the normal form game. More importantly, it is not clear at all whether an equilibrium exists when players adopt this way of playing.
Recently, Caragiannis, Kurokawa and Procaccia [3] created a model for such games and extended the result of equilibrium existence for a more general class of games, called biased games. A biased game is defined by a normal form game, a base strategy for each player and a penalty, or bias, function for each player that depends on the distance between his base strategy and the strategy he plays. The utility of a player is the sum of the payoff he gets from the normal form game minus the penalty he receives for deviating from his base strategy. In [3] it was proven that when the penalty functions for all players are non-decreasing, continuous, convex, and the distance between the base and the strategy played is an L p norm, then an equilibrium always exists. Although an equilibrium in a biased game is interpreted in the same way as in a normal form game, i.e. no player can increase his utility by unilaterally changing his strategy, unfortunately, due to the nature of the utilities in biased games, the rest of the nice properties that characterize an NE do not hold for equilibria in biased games. Thus, new techniques are required in order to compute them. L   2 2 . The authors in [3] proved the equilibrium existence result for a large family of penalty functions where the distance between the strategy played and the base strategy is any L p norm. In this paper we study the case where the penalty is the L 2 2 norm, that is the square of the euclidean distance. This class of penalty functions was studied in [3] as well and we believe that it is among the most natural to consider. Even for this special class of bias functions though there are several differences between NEs in normal form games and equilibria in biased games that make equilibrium computation a challenging task. The main difference is that even the characterization of an equilibrium is non trivial. In an NE of a normal form game every player plays with positive probability only his pure best responses. This property does not hold in biased games as the authors in [3] demonstrate with an example. Thus, the verification of an equilibrium in a biased game can be done only by checking whether each player plays his best response against the other players. Note that the best response for each player is the solution of a quadratic program that is in general a hard problem to solve. For this class of games though, it can be solved in polynomial time via the ellipsoid algorithm [17] .
Bias functions in
For this class of penalty functions Caragiannis et al. [3] gave an exponential algorithm for computing exact equilibria. More specifically, it was proven that under L 2 2 penalties, an equilibrium can be computed by applying the support enumeration algorithm [22] . Although support enumeration is the most naive algorithm for normal form games, it was not obvious at all that it could even be applied for biased games. The authors used the KKT conditions in their analysis and proved that an equilibrium can be computed by exhaustively searching over all possible supports for the players.
Approximate equilibria. Since normal form games is a special case of biased games, the PPAD-hardness result [5, 7] for the equilibrium computation problem for the latter holds. Given this hardness result for normal form games, a line of work has arisen that studies the computational aspects of approximate Nash equilibria. The most widely studied notion is of an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium, which requires that all players have an expected payoff that is within ǫ of a best response. This is an additive notion of approximate equilibrium; the problem of computing approximate equilibria of bimatrix games using a relative notion of approximation is known to be PPAD-hard even for constant approximations [6] .
In this paper we extend the notion of additive approximate equilibria in the biased games setting and we initiate their study in the context of two player biased games with L 2 2 penalty functions. In the general model of [3] the bias penalty was scaled and it could be arbitrarily smaller or larger than the payoff a player gets from the normal form game. This can make the players indifferent for the penalty they get or for their payoff from the normal form game, and potentially make the computation of approximate equilibria easier. For this reason we study two special penalty functions from the L 2 2 class that somehow balance the payoff from the normal form game and the bias penalty. We note that our techniques can be applied in any two player biased game irrespective of the payoffs of the normal form game and the scaling of the penalty functions, but the approximation guarantee will change.
The first class of penalty functions we study, denoted by C 1 , is the L 2 2 distance between the strategy played and a fixed (mixed) strategy for each player. As a special case, we study one sided bias games where only one player receives a penalty according to C 1 . An example of one sided bias games is the security games, since we can assume that the defender has a prior strategy but the attacker does not. The penalty the defender receives can be seen as the cost for changing his strategy. The second class of penalty functions we study, denoted by C 2 , is the inner product of the (mixed) strategy a player plays. This class of games can be seen as games where the players have to put effort in order to to play a pure strategy. These two classes are similar to each other and we use a non approximation preserving reduction between them.
Our contributions. We initiate the study of computing approximate equilibria in two player biased games with L 2 2 penalties. Firstly, we derive a simple combinatorial algorithm for computing best responses by exploiting the KKT conditions from the best response quadratic program. Note that our algorithm is strongly polynomial and thus it is considerably faster than the ellipsoid algorithm. The KKT conditions are used to derive explicit formulas for the probabilities that each pure strategy is played in a best response. Building on that, we provide the first polynomial algorithm that computes non trivial approximate equilibria. More specifically, we compute 13 21 -equilibria for games in C 2 and 89 121 -equilibria for one sided biased games. Furthermore, we study the existence of pure equilibria and we prove that games in C 1 have at most one pure equilibrium, whereas the games in C 2 do not posses any pure equilibrium.
Related work. Our paper is based on [3] , where biased games were defined. As the authors in [3] state, biased games are related to psychological games [1, 14] . The way the biased games are modeled, is close to what psychologists call anchoring [4, 16] . Anchoring is common in poker 3 and in fact there are several papers on poker that are reminiscent of anchoring [12, 13, 15] . In the context of congestion games Meir and Parkes [18] studied the price of anarchy when the players are biased.
So far, ǫ-Nash equilibria have mainly been studied in the context of bimatrix games. A line of work [2, 8, 9] has investigated the best ǫ that can be guaranteed in polynomial time for bimatrix games. The current best result, due to Tsaknakis and Spirakis [20] , is a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a 0.3393-Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game. Unfortunately, the majority of these algorithms cannot directly be applied in our setting. The only technique that can be applied in our setting, since we can compute best responses efficiently, is a modification of the DMP algorithm [9] as we show that requires extra technical analysis in order to obtain good approximation guarantees.
Preliminaries
We start by fixing some notation. For each n ∈ N we use [n] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. Furthermore, we use ∆ n to denote the (n− 1)-dimensional simplex.
Games and Strategies. An n × n bimatrix game is a pair of (R, C) of two n × n matrices: R gives payoff for the row player, and C gives the payoffs for the column player. We make the standard assumption that all payoffs lie in the range [0, 1] . Each player has n pure strategies. To play the game, both players simultaneously select a pure strategy: the row player selects a row i ∈ [n], and the column player selects a column j ∈ [n]. The row player then receives payoff R i,j , and the column player receives payoff C i,j . A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over [n]. We denote a mixed strategy for the row player as a vector x of length n, such that x i is the probability that the row player assigns to pure strategy i. A mixed strategy of the column player is a vector y of length n, with the same interpretation. Given a mixed strategy x for either player, the support of x is the set of pure strategies i with x i > 0. If x and y are mixed strategies for the row and the column player, respectively, then we call (x, y) a mixed strategy profile. The expected payoff for the row player under strategy profile (x, y) is given by x T Ry and for the column player by x T Cy.
Biased Two Player Games. A biased game B between two players is defined by an n × n bimatrix game (R, C), two points p and q in R n , and two penalty functions f r ( x − p ) and f c ( y − q ), where · is an L p norm. The utility for the row player under a strategy profile (x, y) in a biased game, denoted by T r (x, y), is given by the expected payoff of the bimatrix game, x T Ry, minus a penalty f r ( x − p ). In [3] it was proven that when the penalty functions are non decreasing, continuous and convex and the norm is any L p norm then an equilibrium always exists. We focus on two special classes of L 2 2 penalty functions: a) B(R, C, p, q). In this class of games p ∈ ∆ n and q ∈ ∆ n . This means that the p and q are the base strategies for the players and the penalty each player receives is the square of the Euclidean distance between his base strategy and the strategy he plays. Formally, the utilities for the players under strategy profile (x, y) are given by
b) B(R, C). In this case p = q = 0. The utilities for the players under strategy profile (x, y) are
We say that x * is a best response for the row player against strategy y if T r (x * , y) ≥ T r (x, y) for all possible x. Notice that unlike the normal form games where a best response can be computed in polynomial time by simply computing the payoff of each pure strategy, in the biased games we study a response is the solution of the problem maxx T r (x, y) which is a quadratic program. In Section 3 we give a simple polynomial combinatorial algorithm that tackles this problem. Notice that a game B(R, C, p, q) can be transformed in B(R ′ , C ′ ) where R ′ and C ′ depend on p and q respectively.
Solution Concepts. The standard solution concept for bimatrix games is the Nash equilibrium (NE). A relaxed version of this concept is the approximate NE, or ǫ-NE. Intuitively, a strategy profile is an ǫ-NE if no player can increase his payoff more than ǫ by unilaterally changing his strategy. Formally, a strategy profile (x, y) is an ǫ-NE for the bimatrix game (R, C) if
We extend the notion of approximate equilibria for biased games. Formally, a strategy profile (x, y) is an ǫ-equilibrium for the biased game B if the following two condition hold
The value of ǫ represents the maximum increase on the utility of any of the players when he plays a best response against a given strategy of his opponent. In many cases we call this value as the regret that a player suffers under the strategy profile (x, y). We will use R i (x, y) to denote the regret of player i under strategy profile (x, y).
Approximation guarantees. In normal form games it is assumed that the payoffs of the players are in [0, 1], since any rescaling on them does not change the (approximate) Nash equilibria of the game. In our setting though this is not the case since there is no obvious transformation of the payoffs that preserves the approximate equilibria of the game. Thus, in order to have a consistent meaning of approximation, we assume that the payoffs of the normal form game the players participate in are in [0, 1] . Furthermore, notice that the range of the utilities in these two classes are different. The minimum utility in B(R, C) is always -1 whereas in B(R, C, p, q) is bounded by -2. The maximum utility in B(R, C, p, q) depends on the base strategy and in B(R, C) depends in general on the size of the game too. Thus, for both classes of games the approximation guarantee of a strategy profile can be larger than 1. In Section 5 we argue that any strategy profile with approximation guarantee greater than 1 is strictly dominated, thus we are seeking for polynomial algorithms with approximation guarantee strictly less than 1.
Computing best responses
As we said earlier, in order to compute a best response for a player in the class of games we study in this paper we have to solve a quadratic program. In this section we give a simple combinatorial algorithm for computing best responses efficiently. Our algorithm uses the Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT) conditions and it can be applied on all penalty functions of the form c x − dp 2 2 where c and d are rational numbers. For notation simplicity though, we describe our method for c = d = 1. In what follows in this section, we focus on the computation of the best response for the row player, thus for the remaining of this section we assume that strategy y of the column player is fixed.
Before we proceed, let us define α i := R i y + 2p i , where R i is the ith row of matrix R. We call α i as the payoff of pure strategy i. Then the utility for the row player can be written as
Notice that the term p T p is a constant and it does not affect the solution of the best response; so we can exclude it from our computations. Thus, a best response for the row player against strategy y is the solution of the following quadratic program
The Lagrangian function for this problem is
and the corresponding KKT conditions
(1)
Constraints (1)- (3) are the stationarity conditions and (4) are the complementarity slackness conditions. We say that strategy x is a feasible response if it satisfies the KKT conditions. The obvious way to compute a best response is by exhaustively checking all 2 n possible combinations for the complementarity conditions and choose the feasible response that maximizes the utility for a player. Next we prove how we can bypass the brute force technique and compute all best responses in polynomial time.
In what follows, without loss of generality, we assume that α 1 ≥ . . . ≥ α n . In the next lemma we prove that in every best response if a player plays with positive probability the pure strategy l then he must play with positive probability all pure strategies k where k < l, i.e. all the pure strategies that yield payoff greater or equal than pure strategy l.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction suppose that there is a best response x * and a k < l such that x * l > 0 and
. Suppose now that we shift some probability, denoted by δ, from pure strategy l to pure strategy k. Then his utility is T r (x
. Notice that δ > 0 since α k ≥ α l and x * l > 0, thus the row player can increase his utility by assigning positive probability to pure strategy k which contradicts the fact that x * is a best response.
⊓ ⊔
A direct consequence from Lemma 1 is a polynomial algorithm for computing best responses. The algorithm checks all the n possibilities for the support, checks whether there is a feasible response with this support and computes its utility and finally chooses the feasible response with the highest utility.
Before we describe formally our algorithm we exploit the KKT conditions and we derive the exact probability that each pure strategy is played in a feasible response. We derive the probability as a function of α i s and of the support size. Suppose that the KKT conditions produce a feasible response when we set the support to have size k. From condition (1) we get that x i = . This means that for all i ∈ [k] we get
From Equation (5) we can see that in every feasible response the probability that a pure strategy i is played increases with the value of α i . Moreover, we can see that all pure strategies that yield the same payoff are played with the same probability. This can be used in order to speed up our algorithm by adding all pure strategies that yield the same payoff in the support and check for a feasible response.
Best Response Algorithm
3. Check if there is a feasible response under these constraints.
4. Among the feasible responses choose one with the highest utility.
Pure equilibria
In this section we study the existence of pure equilibria in biased games, i.e. equilibria where both players play only one pure strategy. We prove that the biased games in the classes we consider have at most one pure equilibrium. More specifically, we show that no biased game B(R, C) has pure equilibria and that the biased games B(R, C, p, q) have at most one pure equilibrium where both players play the pure strategy that they have the greatest bias. Firstly, we prove that no biased game B(R, C) has pure equilibria.
Lemma 2.
No biased bimatrix game B(R, C) has pure equilibria.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there is an equilibrium in B(R, C) where both players, without loss of generality, play their first pure strategy. We will focus on the row player. Suppose now that he shifts some probability to his second strategy, that is he plays the first strategy with probability x and the second strategy with probability 1 − x. If we use r ij to denote the (i, j)-th entry of the payoff matrix R, then the utility for the row player under the mixed strategy is x · r 11
. Then
, which means that the row player can deviate from the pure strategy and increase his utility. Thus, the pure strategy profile cannot be an equilibrium strategy for the row player.
⊓ ⊔ Next we focus on biased games of the form B(R, C, p, q). In the following lemma we prove that biased games in this class do not possess pure equilibria where at least one of the players plays a pure strategy that he does not have the greatest bias for. Lemma 3. The pure strategy profile (i, j) can be an equilibrium in the biased game B(R, C, p, q) only if p i ≥ p i ′ for all i ′ = i and q j ≥ q j ′ for all j ′ = j.
Proof. Without loss of generality suppose that p 1 ≥ p 2 ≥ . . . ≥ p n and that q 1 ≥ . . . ≥ q n . We will focus on the row player. For the sake of contradiction suppose now that there is a pure equilibrium in B(R, C, p, q) such that the row player plays his second strategy and the column player plays his first strategy. Let π denote this pure strategy profile. Let us now allow the row player to mix between his first and his second pure strategy with the probability distribution (x, 1 − x), where x is the probability that the first pure strategy is played. His utility then is −2x 2 + (r 11 − r 21 + 2 + 2p 1 − 2p 2 )x + r 21 − 1 + 2p 2 − p T p, which is maximized for
In order π to be an equilibrium it must be true that x = 0. This means that r 11 −r 21 +2+2p 1 −2p 2 = 0. Notice that since p 1 ≥ p 2 we get that 2p 1 −2p 2 ≥ 0. Thus, it must be true that r 11 − r 21 + 2 ≤ 0, which is a contradiction since we have that 0 ≤ r ij ≤ 1 for all ij ∈ n × n.
⊓ ⊔
With Lemma 3 in hand we can prove that a biased game B(R, C, p, q) has at most one pure equilibrium. Theorem 1. Any biased game B(R, C, p, q) has at most one pure equilibrium.
Proof. As we proved in Lemma 3, in a pure equilibrium of B(R, C, p, q) each player must play the pure strategy that has the greatest bias for. Thus, in order to prove that the theorem is correct we only need to consider the case where there are more than one pure strategies with the same largest bias. We will focus again on the row player. Suppose that, without loss of generality, p 1 = p 2 > p i for all i ∈ [3, . . . , n] and that q 1 > q j forall j ∈ [2, . . . , n]. We need to consider two cases. The first one is when r 11 = r 21 = r. If the player plays only one of these strategies, then the utility for the row player is r + 2p 1 − 1 − p T p T . If the player mixes between these two strategies, then according to Equation (5) x 1 = x 2 = 1 2 and the utility for the row player is r+2p 1 − 1 2 −p T p which is larger than the utility the player gets form playing only a pure strategy. The other case we have to consider is when r 11 > r 21 . Then the only pure best response for the row player is to play his first pure strategy. This is due to Lemma 1 which states that if the second pure strategy is played in a best response, then the first pure strategy must be played too. Thus, the theorem follows.
⊓ ⊔
Approximate equilibria
In this section we provide a polynomial algorithm that computes approximate equilibria in biased games. Before we proceed with our algorithm, let us begin by establishing benchmarks for approximation algorithms for both classes of games we study. There are several strategy profiles in both classes of games that give an ǫ-equilibrium, where ǫ > 1, but we believe that this is not a correct benchmark since all mixed strategies with regret larger than one are dominated. In the following two lemmas we prove that this is indeed the case for both classes we consider.
Lemma 4. The regret for any player in B(R, C) when he plays the uniform fully mixed strategy is always bounded by 1.
Unfortunately, we cannot use the uniform fully mixed strategy for bounding the regret of the players in B(R, C, p, q) games. For this class of games we show that the base strategies of the players bound their regrets efficiently.
Lemma 5. In B(R, C, p, q) when the row player plays p his regret is at most 1. The same holds for the column player and the strategy q.
From Lemmas 4 and 5 it is clear that any strategy with regret greater than 1 for any player is dominated by the strategies described above. Thus, our goal is to find polynomial algorithms that compute ǫ-equilibria with ǫ strictly smaller than 1.
Indeed, our algorithm computes approximate equilibria that beat this benchmark for B(R, C) and one sided bias games. Our algorithm is an extension of the well known DMP [9] algorithm, which is used in bimatrix games. The DMP algorithm relies on the computation of best responses against arbitrary strategies, which can be done in polynomial time as we showed in Section 3. In detail, our algorithm computes 13 21 -equilibria for B(R, C) biased games and 89 121 -equilibria for one sided bias games. Notice that although the DMP approach is well known, for the classes of games we study, new technical analysis is required in order to achieve good approximation guarantees.
Let y * be a best response to x n .
3. Letx be a best response to y * .
Set x
In what follows, we will study the strategy profile (x * , y * ) computed by our algorithm, taking δ as a parameter. Later we will optimize over δ in order to prove our approximation guarantees. We begin by providing the analysis for B(R, C) games. Firstly, we give a reformulation for the utility of the row player under the strategy profile (x * , y * ).
Next, we bound the regret that the row player suffers under strategy profile (x * , y * ).
Lemma 7.
Under strategy profile (x * , y * ) the regret for the row player is bounded by δ.
Proof. Recall that the regret R r (x * , y * ) for the row player is defined as the maximum increase in his utility given that the column player does not change his strategy. Formally,
Moreover, note that x T x ≥ 1 n for all x and that maxx ∈∆ {x T Ry * −x Tx } − T r (x, y * ) = 0, sincex is a best response against strategy y * . Thus, using Lemma 6 we get that the regret for the row player is bounded by
which is our claimed bound.
⊓ ⊔ Before we bound the regret for the column player under the strategy profile (x * , y * ) we bound the probability that a pure strategy can be played in any best response.
Lemma 8. In y * no pure strategy is played with probability greater than 3/4.
Proof. We will prove our claim by contradiction. Suppose that there is a pure strategy i in y * that is played with probability greater than 3/4. Furthermore, let k be the support size of y * . From Lemma 2 we know that there is no pure best response, thus k ≥ 2. Then using Equation (5) we get that
. If we solve for α j we get that α i > 3k−4 2k−2 > 1 which is a contradiction since in B(R, C) we have that
⊓ ⊔ Now we can bound the regret of the column player more efficiently since a direct corollary from Lemma 8 is that y * T y * ≤ 5/8.
Lemma 9.
Under strategy profile (x * , y * ) the regret for the column player is bounded by
n . Finally, notice that 0 ≤ y T y ≤ 1 for all y. Thus, the regret for the column player is
which matches the claimed result.
⊓ ⊔
If we combine Lemmas 7 and 9 and solve for δ we can see that the regrets are equal for δ = 13 21 . Thus, we get the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The strategy profile (x * , y * ) is a 13 21 -equilibrium for the biased game B(R, C).
Next we study the special case where only one player has a bias function. We will assume that only the column player has a penalty of the form y−q 2 2 where q ∈ ∆ n . Notice that under strategy profile (x * , y * ) produced by our algorithm, the regret for the row player who does not have a bias is bounded by δ. If we assume that q k = max i q i , then using similar analysis as in Lemma 9 we get that
It is easy to see that the regrets are equal for δ = 2+2q k 3+2q k and since q k ≤ 1 we get Algorithm 1 produces a 4/5-equilibrium. This is the trivial bound we get from Algorithm 1. Next we show that our algorithm actually achieves a better approximation guarantee. We will study how the maximum bias for a pure strategy affects our algorithm. More specifically, we study whether there is a pure strategy k with q k > 1/2 or not.
Firstly, we deal with the case where q k ≤ 1 2 for all k. Using similar analysis as in Lemma 2 we can prove that there is no pure best response and using similar analysis as in Lemma 8 we can prove that y * T y * ≤ 50/64. Then the regret for the column player under (x * , y * ) is bounded by 178 64 (1 − δ) and if we optimize over δ we get the following lemma.
121 -equilibrium. Next we study the case where there is a k with q k > 1/2, and our first goal is to show that in every best response y * for the column player, the pure strategy k is played with positive probability.
Lemma 11.
If there is a k where q k > 1/2, then in every best response y * the pure strategy k is played with positive probability.
Using now Lemma 11 we can provide a better bound for the regret the column player suffers, since in every best response y * the pure strategy k is played with positive probability.
Lemma 12. Let y * be a best response when there is a pure strategy k with q k > 1/2. Then the regret for the column player under strategy profile (x * , y * ) is bounded by 2 − 2δ.
Proof. Before we proceed with our analysis we assume without loss of generality that k = 1. Recall from the analysis for the Algorithm 1 that the regret for the column player is
We focus now on the term y *
Recall now that the regret for the row player is bounded by δ, so if we optimize with respect to δ the regrets are equal for δ = 2/3. Thus, the next theorem follows, since when the there is a k with q k > 1/2 the Algorithm 1 produces a 2/3-equilirbium.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 1 produces a 89/121-equilibrium for one sided biased games.
Conclusions and open questions
We initiated the study of the computation of approximate equilibria in biased games. We focused on the class of games where players have L 2 2 penalties. We provided a simple combinatorial algorithm for computing best responses and we derived explicit formulas for the probabilities that pure strategies are played in best responses. Building on that, we generalized the DMP algorithm for two player biased games and we got the first non trivial approximation guarantees for games with penalties of the form x T x and for one sided bias games. An immediate question is to compute better approximation guarantees for these classes and approximate equilibria with regret strictly less than 1 for B(R, C, p, q) when both players have bias towards a mixed strategy. We believe that the optimization approach used in [20] and in [10] might tackle this problem.
Several interesting questions stem from our paper. The most important one is to understand the computational complexity of equilibrium computation in biased games. Given that computing an exact Nash equilibrium in normal form games is PPAD-complete, we cannot hope that there is a polynomial algorithm that computes exact equilibria in biased two player games. Futhermore, notice that in our case the players are not expectation maximizers. In [11] Fiat and Papadimitriou studied classes of games where the players are not expectation maximizers and proved PPAD-completeness for several classes of utilities. Is the equilibrium computation problem PPAD-complete for the two classes of games we studied? Are there any subclasses of biased games, e.g. when the underlying normal form game is zero sum, that are easy to solve?
Proof. Note that α k > 1 since we assume that q k > 1/2. Recall from Equation (5) that in a feasible response y we have that
In order to prove our claim we have to show that y k > 0 when we set y i > 0 for all i ∈ [k] in the KKT conditions. Thus, we only have to show that
Our claim follows. ⊓ ⊔ Then using the Equation (5) we compute the utility under any feasible response, having the support size as a parameter. . Then the utility for the column player is T c (x, y k ) =
Proof. Recall from Equation (5) that in a feasible response y k the ith pure strategy is played with probability y k i = αi 2 − λ(k). If we compute the utility for the row player we get
⊓ ⊔
Next, we prove that utility of a player is increasing while he adds strategies with payoff greater than 1 in the support.
Lemma 15. Let y k and y k+1 be two feasible responses with support size k and k + 1 respectively, where α k+1 > 1. Then T c (x, y k+1 ) > T c (x, y k ).
Proof. We will prove that T c (x, y k+1 ) − T c (x, y k ) > 0. If we denote with A = > 0.
Notice that α k ≥ 2p k > 1. Thus, the utility of the feasible response that assigns positive probability to pure strategy k is strictly greater than the utilities of the feasible responses that did not assign probability to k. Thus strategy k is always played in a best response. Thus, the value of y * T y * − 2y * k q k is maximized when y * k = 1 and our claim follows.
